Beyond rising unemployment: unemployment risk, crisis and regional adjustments in Greece by Monastiriotis, Vassilis & Martelli, Angelo
  
 
 
All views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the Hellenic Observatory or the LSE 
© Vassilis Monastiriotis and Angelo Martelli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beyond Rising Unemployment: 
Unemployment Risk, Crisis and Regional 
Adjustments in Greece 
 
 
 
Vassilis Monastiriotis and Angelo Martelli 
 
 
 
 
 
GreeSE Paper No.80 
Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe 
 
 
 
 
DECEMBER 2013 
 
 ii 
 
_
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT __________________________________________________________ iii 
1. Introduction _____________________________________________________ 1 
2. Data and method _________________________________________________ 5 
3. Unemployment risk in the Greek regions _____________________________ 11 
3.1 ‘Baseline’ unemployment risk __________________________________ 12 
3.2 Unemployment risk and education ______________________________ 16 
3.3 Unemployment risk for other characteristics ______________________ 20 
4. Decomposition analysis: macro-geographies of unemployment ___________ 27 
5. Conclusions _____________________________________________________ 38 
APPENDIX __________________________________________________________ 43 
References _________________________________________________________ 49 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  iii 
 
Beyond Rising Unemployment: 
Unemployment Risk, Crisis and Regional 
Adjustments in Greece 
 
Vassilis Monastiriotis # and Angelo Martelli  
 
ABSTRACT 
The remarkable rise in unemployment in Greece has in a way 
overshadowed the substantial differentiation, across regions, in terms of 
regional unemployment and labour market adjustment. This paper 
examines the geography of these dynamics using probit regressions of 
unemployment risk and decomposing the observed regional 
unemployment differentials into three components corresponding to 
differences in labour quality, matching efficiency and effective demand. 
We find that, underlying the general increase in unemployment is a 
wealth of unemployment dynamics and adjustment trajectories. The fall 
in effective demand has been largest in the main metropolitan regions 
and the north and north-western periphery. Adjustment has been strong 
in some areas (e.g., Athens) but, overall, adjustment processes (such as 
bumping-down and changes in the mix of workforce characteristics) 
have been weak. The crisis has nullified the improvements in labour 
market performance registered since the country’s entry into the 
Eurozone, hitting especially those regions that benefitted most from the 
latter. The spatial differentiation of adjustment intensities and demand 
pressures suggests a heightened role for regional policy in the post-crisis 
period, especially in relation to addressing problems of over-education 
and matching efficiency in the demand-depressed areas and of inter-
regional adjustment mechanisms nationally. 
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Beyond Rising Unemployment: 
Unemployment Risk, Crisis and Regional 
Adjustments in Greece 
 
1. Introduction 
As is well documented, unemployment in Greece has increased 
immensely during the last four years, reaching over 27% by early 2013. 
In many respects this increase has been universal, affecting all regions in 
a broadly similar fashion, as the shock that instigated it (the Greek fiscal 
crisis) was exogenous to the regions and seemingly symmetric (for 
evidence against this, see Monastiriotis, 2011). At a closer inspection, 
however, some notable heterogeneity emerges with regard to regional 
unemployment evolutions (see Fig.1). In 2012, unemployment rates 
ranged between less than 15% in the Ionian and over 30% in Western 
Macedonia. Moreover, between 2008 and 2012 unemployment rates 
increased by a ‘low’ 140% (or less) in the regions of Ipeiros, Ionian, 
Western Macedonia and South Aegean; but by multiples of this (over 
300%) in Crete, Athens and the North Aegean. Curiously, membership 
into these groups is not easy to interpret. For example, the ‘low-rise’ 
group includes the region with the highest unemployment rate in the 
country (Western Macedonia), both historically and in 2012, as well as 
two regions that have had historically among the lowest unemployment 
rates nationally (Ionian and South Aegean). Similarly, the ‘high-rise’ 
group includes a large metropolitan area (Athens), a less dense but 
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touristically developed region (Crete), and a rather underdeveloped 
region of remote and unconnected islands (North Aegean). 
Figure 1. Evolution of regional unemployment in Greece, 2000-2012 
 
Source: Greek Labour Force Survey (various years); authors’ manipulations. Data used with 
permission from the Hellenic Statistical Authority.  
To some extent at least, this variation must be reflective of the ‘multiple 
heterogeneity’ that characterises the Greek economic space 
(Monastiriotis, 2009 – see also Petrakos and Psycharis, 2004) – resulting 
in this case in some notable differences in types/intensities of labour 
market adjustment across the Greek regions, albeit around a common 
national path of fast rising unemployment. Partly motivated by this 
heterogeneity, in this paper we go beyond the descriptive analysis of 
patterns of unemployment and unemployment change, as depicted in 
Figure 1, and examine instead how regional unemployment differentials, 
and their changes, relate to regional differences in underlying 
unemployment risk and related demand and supply pressures.  
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To perform this analysis, we adopt a micro-econometric approach and 
look at the incidence and determinants of unemployment risk across the 
Greek regions1 using probit regressions on individual-level data derived 
from the Greek Labour Force Survey covering the period 2000-2012. 
Following Lopez-Bazo and Motellon (2013)2 we further apply an 
unemployment-risk decomposition analysis across groups of regions of 
different structural, economic and locational characteristics for periods 
before and during the crisis, in order to examine how different types of 
regional labour markets have responded to the crisis.  
Examining unemployment risk in this way allows us to identify a number 
of distinctive influences exerted on the regional labour markets of 
Greece, which may be hard to unveil in an aggregate-level analysis.3 
First, using the regional fixed-effects from the probit regressions, we 
derive a measure of unemployment that is net of personal 
characteristics and of the unemployment risk assigned to each of these 
individually (expressed in terms of a ‘baseline’ worker profile that is 
common in all regions and years). We interpret this as a measure of 
effective demand4 for each regional labour market – and variations in 
this as a measure of the relative intensity of the demand shock 
experienced by each regional labour market under the crisis. We also 
derive a measure of relative demand through our decomposition 
                                                 
1
 We use the 15 statistical regions reported in the Greek LFS comprising the 13 NUTS2 regions, with 
the metropolitan areas of Athens (part of the NUTS2 region of Attiki) and Thessaloniki (part of Central 
Macedonia) reported separately. 
2
 For an earlier implementation of the decomposition approach, examining differences across ethnic 
groups, see Blackaby et al (1999). 
3
 Elhorst (2003) discusses the limitations of aggregate-level analyses of unemployment in the absence 
of good-quality regional data and ‘perfect knowledge’ about the correct model describing intra- and 
inter-regional labour market dynamics. 
4
 Evidently, this measure is imperfect as it is not independent of our choice of reference categories in 
the probit regressions – although the use of a fixed reference category over time and across space 
makes it appropriate for cross-regional and temporal comparisons.  
 4 
analysis (for groups of regions), by separating the measured impact of 
the regional fixed effects from that of the individual characteristics, as is 
described in the next section. By doing this, we are able to identify, 
second, the extent of unemployment which is due to relative valuation 
problems, i.e., to regional/group differences in the extent to which 
various individual characteristics are rewarded or penalised (in terms of 
employment probabilities). Evidence on valuation differences, reflecting 
essentially differences across regions in the demand for specific 
workforce characteristics, is also obtained directly from the estimated 
coefficients of our probit regressions (for each region – section 3). Third, 
again drawing on the decomposition analysis, we identify the part of 
unemployment that is due to labour-quality problems, i.e., the extent to 
which the available mix of individual characteristics contributes to 
aggregate unemployment (relative to some reference region).  
Identifying these components is important, as it helps shed some light 
on processes of labour market adjustment – relating for example to the 
efficiency by which different regional labour markets match available 
workforce skills to jobs (labour market or matching efficiency) or the 
extent to which the crisis has intensified processes of job-competition 
(whereby individuals with more ‘marketable’ skills bump-down 
individuals with less competitive characteristics – Thurow, 1975). 
Despite the increased attention on the Greek economy since the 
eruption of the debt crisis, research on these issues in Greece is rather 
limited.5 In that sense, our approach in this paper helps fill a gap in our 
                                                 
5
 See for example Christopoulos (2004), Livanos (2010a), Bakas and Papapetrou (2012), Cholezas et al 
(2012), Koutentakis (2012), Daouli et al (2013).  
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understanding of the prevalence of such processes in the Greek 
economy.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section 
we describe our micro-econometric approach and the decomposition 
technique used to derive the distinct components of unemployment. 
Section 3 presents the results from our analysis of unemployment risk 
across the Greek regions, focusing in particular on the spatial 
differentiation in terms of unemployment risk for specific individual 
characteristics (age, gender, education, etc). In section 4 we shift our 
focus to the macro-geographies of unemployment in Greece and 
examine, through our decomposition analysis, the direction of relative 
labour market adjustments across different regional groupings. Section 5 
concludes with some implications for policy, particularly on the scope 
and priorities of (future) regional policy in Greece.   
2. Data and method 
As mentioned previously, our approach departs from the analysis of 
aggregate unemployment and seeks to investigate the dynamics of 
regional unemployment with the use of individual-level data within the 
context of unemployment-risk probit regressions. The essence of this 
approach is similar to that applied widely in the wage-equations 
literature6: in our case, unemployment status is determined by an 
unobserved latent variable (of a continuously-distributed underlying 
unemployment risk), which is in turn dependent on a set of personal 
                                                 
6
 See Heckman et al (2006) for a review of the so-called Mincer wage equation model.  
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characteristics (plus an area fixed-effect, capturing the overall market 
conditions in each regional labour market). Formally,  
iii bXU 
*
          (1) 
where  is the unobserved (latent) variable measuring the 
unemployment risk of individual i,  is a vector of personal and other 
characteristics of that individual,  is a vector of parameters measuring 
the contribution of each individual characteristic to unemployment risk 
and εi is a normally distributed person-specific disturbance. The 
observed unemployment status U is linked to this latent variable by the 
following condition:  
         (2) 
Under these conditions, the probability of observing U=1 (i.e., someone 
being unemployed) is equal to the standard normal cumulative 
distribution for  and thus the parameter  can be estimated by means 
of a probit regression as 
         (3) 
where  is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution.  
This is a model that has been used widely in the literature to examine 
various issues concerning the incidence and determinants of 
unemployment, including the contribution to unemployment of various 
individual (education – Ashenfelter and Ham, 1979) and family 
characteristics (family size – McGregor, 1978); the impact on 
unemployment of various policy variables (e.g., unemployment benefits 
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– Solon, 1979); issues of labour market discrimination (Stratton, 1993) 
and migrant assimilation (McDonald and Worswick, 1997); and many 
others.7  
In our empirical analysis we use a parsimonious specification, making the 
probability of unemployment a function of an individual’s education (E), 
age (A), gender (S), ethnicity (F), marital status (M) and household size 
(H). We measure education in terms of imputed years of schooling, 
based on information about the level of education completed. Age is 
measured using five age-bands8 to allow for non-linear and threshold 
effects, while gender, ethnicity and marital status are modelled as 
dichotomous variables that take the value of 1 for those female, foreign-
born and married/cohabiting, respectively. Household size is a 
continuous variable measuring the number of people of all ages in the 
household. Thus, our estimating relationship is  
     (4) 
where j stands for the different age-groups. The β-coefficients in this 
model are difficult to interpret, as they are measured in terms of z-
scores of the standard normal cumulative distribution. Thus, when 
presenting our regression results we convert these coefficients into 
marginal effects using the -margins- command in STATA 12 (Williams, 
                                                 
7
 Another approach in the literature to examine such issues is with the use of unemployment duration 
models (e.g., Ham and Rea, 1987). We do not follow this approach here for two reasons. First, as 
mentioned above, because we are interested in the distinction between demand (net unemployment 
risk), supply (labour quality) and matching efficiency (valuation) influences on aggregate 
unemployment risk – i.e., in a decomposition of these that cannot be performed with the use of duration 
models. Second, because good-quality data on unemployment duration are not available in Greece. 
8
 These correspond to 10-year intervals (15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64). We use the prime-age 
group (35-44) as the reference (excluded) category.  
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2012), evaluating the impact of each variable at average sample values 
for all the regression predictors.  
Given our interest in the regional dimension, we estimate this model 
separately for each of the 15 Greek regions. Thus, parameter α in (4) is 
essentially a region-specific fixed-effect, reflecting the rate of regional 
unemployment net of the characteristics of the regional workforce.9 In 
this way, equation (4) allows us to separate between two types of 
influences driving aggregate (average) unemployment in each region: 
one that can be labelled as the ‘baseline’ level of unemployment, which 
is independent of personal characteristics or of their ‘marketability’ (i.e., 
of their propensity to push a person into unemployment) and can thus 
be seen as an indicator of effective demand in each region; and another 
comprising of the individual contributions that each workforce 
characteristic makes to unemployment. By estimating these for different 
regions or years, we can actually measure the extent to which changes in 
unemployment over time (or differences across regions) are due to 
changes/differences in the quality/mix and marketability of specific 
characteristics (corresponding to supply and valuation/matching 
problems) or, instead, due to changes/differences in effective demand.  
We can extend this analysis by disentangling further the 
supply/valuation effect. The standard approach for this in a linear 
regression framework is by means of a decomposition analysis.10 In non-
linear models, however, this decomposition is not straightforward, as 
the different effects in the right-hand-side of the model are not additive 
                                                 
9
 Formally, the fixed effect captures, for each region, the probability of unemployment for a non-
married prime-age native male with no education in a single-person household.  
10
 See Jann (2008) for an accessible presentation of the various decomposition techniques and their 
implementation in empirical analyses.  
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and thus the conditional expectation of the dependent variable will not 
be equal to the regression prediction at mean sample values.11 An early 
solution to this problem was proposed by Gamulka and Stern (1990) for 
the aggregate decomposition, while more recent contributions have 
allowed also the implementation of variable-specific decompositions 
(Yun, 2004) as well as decompositions of the imputed marginal effects 
(Fairlie, 2005).  
The decomposition approach in these cases follows the same logic as the 
standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for linear models.  Starting from 
the general model presented in (3), we calculate average group-specific 
unemployment probabilities for two different groups, say regions A and 
B, and decompose their differences as follows:  
  (6) 
where the bar above each term denotes sample averages. As in the 
standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the first bracket on the right-
hand side gives the difference in average unemployment between 
regions A and B which is due to differences in workforce characteristics; 
while the second bracket gives the part of the unemployment 
differential that is due to differences in the value attached to the various 
characteristics.  
As with the linear decomposition, these components can be ‘evaluated’ 
at different reference values. The decomposition shown in (6) 
corresponds to the standard Blinder-Oaxaca approach, whereby 
‘endowments’ are evaluated at region A coefficients while the 
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 Formally, . See Bauer and Sinning (2008) for a discussion of this.  
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‘coefficients’ component is measured on the basis of region B 
characteristics. Other decompositions are also possible: for example, the 
pooled-estimate decomposition (Neumark, 1988) can also be adapted 
for the case of non-linear models, allowing the ‘endowment’ effect to be 
expressed in terms of full-sample coefficients.12 The same applies for the 
case of the three-way decomposition proposed by Daymont and 
Andrisani (1984), which separates between an ‘endowment’, a ‘price’ 
and an ‘interaction’ effect.  
Implementing any of these decompositions is useful, but in relation to 
our earlier discussion it imposes a crucial problem: the price effect 
derived from such aggregate decompositions includes the contribution 
to regional unemployment differentials of the region-specific fixed-
effects. This prohibits us from distinguishing between ‘effective demand’ 
(fixed-effect) and ‘valuation’ influences (‘coefficients’ effect for 
individual-specific characteristics). To overcome this problem, we need 
to revert to a variable-specific decomposition. A method for this, in the 
case of non-linear models, was proposed by Yun (2004) and is 
implemented in STATA using the -oaxaca- command developed by Jann 
(2008). The method also performs a correction for the ‘decomposition 
identification problem’ (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999; Yun, 2005).13 With 
the use of this technique, we are able to decompose any observed 
unemployment differential between two groups of regions into three 
                                                 
12
 In that case, the ‘price’ effect is essentially measured as the difference between average 
characteristics in A valuated in terms of the price advantage in A relative to the full sample and the 
average characteristics in B valuated in terms of the analogous price advantage in B. 
13
 The problem arises in models that include dichotomous variables as regressors, as the value of the 
estimated intercept becomes dependent on the reference category selected. The technique used here 
(Yun, 2005) corrects for this by essentially averaging out across estimates derived from the use of 
alternative reference categories. As a result, the estimated fixed-effects become independent of the 
choice of reference categories for the dichotomous variables, allowing their interpretation here as 
measures of effective demand (in this case, irrespective of the ‘baseline’ profile).  
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distinctive components: one capturing differences in labour quality (the 
‘endowment’ or ‘explained’ component); one capturing differences in 
the valuation of marketable characteristics and thus in the mix of 
attributes (e.g., skill-content) demanded in each labour market (the sum 
of the individual variable-specific ‘coefficient’ components); and one 
capturing differences in effective demand across the two groups of 
regions (the estimated variable-specific ‘coefficient’ component 
corresponding to the fixed-effect).  
With this “technology”, we set out to explore the questions elaborated 
earlier, concerning the sources of unemployment in Greece and their 
regional differentiation before and during the crisis. In the empirical 
analysis that follows we use data from the spring-quarter waves of the 
Greek labour force survey for the years 2000-2012. We derive 
information on the range of individual and family characteristics 
depicted in equation (4) and restrict our sample to working-age 
respondents who were either employed or had actively looked for a job 
in the two weeks prior to the survey. After some data cleaning, the 
typical year contains some 30,000-35,000 observations.14 Some basic 
descriptive statistics for our key variables (for selected years) are 
presented in the Appendix.  
3.  Unemployment risk in the Greek regions 
 The first task in our analysis is to measure the individual contribution of 
various personal and household characteristics to unemployment risk 
and their differentiation over time and across space. With over half a 
                                                 
14
 The number of observations in the Greek Labour Force Survey declines in more recent years. In 
2012, our effective sample includes just over 25,000 observations.  
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dozen such characteristics evaluated across 15 regions over a 13-year 
period (2000-2012), the number of estimated coefficients that we are 
potentially interested in exceeds 1,500. To facilitate presentation and 
discussion, we make use of GIS tools and present a number of maps 
where we depict, for each variable of interest, the corresponding 
marginal effect derived for each of the 15 regions of Greece over two 
periods: before (2005-2008) and during the crisis (2009-2012). Full tables 
of results for all 15 regions for selected years (2000, 2004, 2008 and 
2012) reporting marginal effects are given in the Appendix.15 We make 
selective reference to region- and year-specific estimates in the text, 
where relevant. Overall, our probit regressions perform well, with the 
Wald statistic testing for the validity of the model being always 
significant at even the 0.1% and an average value for the McFadden 
pseudo R-squared of 0.12.  
3.1 ‘Baseline’ unemployment risk 
Starting with the region-specific fixed effects, we note that these are 
always statistically significant and negative in the early periods, 
indicating low ‘baseline’ probabilities of unemployment before the crisis 
(see Table A.2 and Figure 2), but become statistically weaker and 
sometimes even positive during the crisis. In 2000, the estimated fixed-
effects range from -0.84 to -2.58, corresponding to ‘net’ unemployment 
rates16 of between 0.5% (in the South Aegean) and 20% (in Western 
Macedonia) – with the two main metropolitan areas (Athens and 
                                                 
15
 Direct regression estimates (z-score coefficients) and full results for all years can be made available 
upon request.  
16
 Net unemployment rates deriving from the fixed effects have been calculated using the one-sided 
cumulative function of the standard normal distribution. As noted already, these rates should not be 
seen as absolute measures of effective demand but rather as the unemployment-risk probabilities 
corresponding to our ‘baseline’ individual.  
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Thessaloniki) not far behind the maximum value. Importantly, in some 
cases the predicted ‘net’ unemployment rates deviate significantly from 
the actual unemployment rates observed: for example, Ipeiros has a net 
unemployment of 4.9% but an actual rate of 11.4% (for the South 
Aegean the corresponding values are 0.5% and 6.3%); while North 
Aegean, with an actual rate of 8.0% returns a ‘net’ unemployment of 
16.4%. Such differences inevitably reflect underlying differences across 
regions in labour quality and matching efficiency / valuation. In the 
above example, the North Aegean appears to have superior labour 
quality and/or to be much more effective in matching available skills to 
local jobs compared to Ipeiros (or the South Aegean).  
 14 
Figure 2. Baseline unemployment risk, by region and selected years 
  
(a) 2000       (b) 2004 
 
(c) 2008      (d) 2012 
Notes: ‘Baseline’ unemployment rates have been calculated using the one-sided cumulative 
function of the standard normal distribution for each of the estimated regional fixed effects 
from the probit regressions. See discussion in the text for more details.  
Over time the estimated ‘net’ unemployment rates change in interesting 
ways. While between 2000 and 2004 the (unweighted) average 
prediction of ‘net’ unemployment remains rather stable (from 9.1% to 
8.8%), in 2004 the range of net unemployment rates increases quite 
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substantially, with a minimum of 2.4% observed in Central Macedonia 
(and similar values in Thessaly, the Peloponnese and the North Aegean) 
and a maximum, again in Western Macedonia, of 32.0%. By 2008, 
average ‘net’ unemployment had declined notably (to 7.5%, roughly 
equal to the actual national unemployment rate at the time) and so did 
its range (from 3.3% in the North Aegean to 16.0% in Thessaloniki). As 
we move into the crisis, however, predicted ‘net’ unemployment rates 
rise dramatically (in line with the actual rates), reaching in 2012 an 
average value of 31.5%.17 In that year, only one region had a net 
unemployment rate below 10% (South Aegean: 6.2%), while values 
above 50% were observed in Western Macedonia and the two 
metropolitan regions (the maximum was in Thessaloniki at 64.9%). 
Clearly, the crisis has represented a significant shock to the Greek labour 
market, with net unemployment quadrupling in the space of four years. 
Still, the effect across space was very heterogeneous, hitting 
disproportionately the north-western and metropolitan regions (and 
their hinterlands) but having a much lower impact in the southern and 
island regions of the country (fourth panel of Figure 2).  
As already noted, the estimated ‘net’ unemployment rates are often 
significantly, but far from uniformly, different from the actual 
unemployment rates observed in the regions. This suggests that 
differences in the mix of workforce characteristics, and especially in the 
unemployment risk assigned to each of these, play an important role for 
the level of unemployment attained in each region. Thus, our focus now 
turns to this latter source of differentiation. 
                                                 
17
 Actual national unemployment in spring 2012 was 24.2%.  
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3.2 Unemployment risk and education 
Starting with the education variable (Figure 3), an interesting 
observation emerges immediately: for a number of regions, higher levels 
of education do not appear to be associated with lower levels of 
unemployment risk. This is true throughout the pre-crisis period for the 
regions of Eastern Macedonia & Thrace (EMT), Central Macedonia, and 
Crete; while for the majority of the remaining regions it is true at least 
for subsets of this period. In fact, education returns a statistically 
significant negative effect (reducing unemployment) consistently only in 
the two metropolitan regions (Athens and Thessaloniki) and the two 
partly-industrialised regions of Western Macedonia (energy sector) and 
Continental Greece (hosting a part of the Athens industrial complex).  
Grouping, however, over the four years preceding the crisis (first panel 
of Figure 4), produces results with higher statistical significance. In this 
case, education continues to have no effect on unemployment risk in 
only four regions (EMT, Thessaly, North Aegean and Crete). The effect is 
highest in Western Macedonia (where an additional year of schooling is 
associated with a 1.24% drop in the probability of being unemployed). 
For most other regions the impact of education is much more modest 
(between 0.4% and 0.7%), while it is lowest in the more agricultural 
regions of Western Greece and Peloponnese. It appears that prior to the 
crisis there was a clear dichotomy between agricultural and non-
agricultural regions in the role that education played in mediating 
unemployment risk: in agricultural regions demand for skilled (in terms 
of education) labour has been weak – the corollary of this is that these 
regions have a relative over-supply of education. 
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Figure 3. Marginal unemployment risk for education, by region and 
selected years 
 
(a) 2000      (b) 2004 
 
(c) 2008      (d) 2012 
Notes: Marginal effects for the continuous education variable calculated at average sample 
values and derived from region-specific probit regressions of individual unemployment risk. 
See discussion in the text for more details.  
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Figure 4. Marginal unemployment risk for education, by region and 
period 
 
(a) Pre-crisis (2005-08)   (b) Post-crisis (2009-12) 
Notes: See notes in Figure 3.  
On the basis of the period-level analysis, the situation appears to have 
changed only little with the crisis (second panel of Figure 4), with the 
marginal effect of education remaining rather low in all regions 
(maximum value is now 1.5% in Thessaloniki, followed closely by 
Western Macedonia and Athens). The agricultural – non-agricultural 
distinction is now somewhat less strong, but two regions (Peloponnese 
and Crete) continue to exhibit no reduced unemployment risk for better-
educated workers. The picture however is notably different when 
comparing individual years. Between 2008 and 2012 (last two panels of 
Figure 3) the returns to education became positive (from non-significant) 
in five regions (EMT, Central Macedonia, Thessaly, North Aegean and 
Crete), while they doubled in Western Macedonia and Continental 
Greece and grew even faster in Ipeiros, Thessaloniki and Athens. On the 
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other hand, the unemployment risk associated to education increased in 
Attica and the Ionian, while it remained non-significant in the 
Peloponnese, Western Greece and the South Aegean.  
Given the distinctive role of education as an indicator of skills (and as a 
screening device for employers), these developments can be used to 
make inferences about the functioning of the Greek labour market prior 
and during the crisis. Evidently, large parts of Greece are characterised 
by an over-supply of skills (over-education). Especially prior to the crisis, 
this was also reflected in the above-average unemployment rates for 
university graduates (Livanos, 2010b). The crisis is unlikely to have raised 
in any significant degree the skill-content of new jobs; but it has created 
conditions of job-competition and bumping down, leading to lower 
unemployment risks associated with education in large parts of the 
country. Still, a number of regions, some of which are at least partly 
exposed to international demand (e.g., Attica and the touristic region of 
South Aegean), exhibit even today a curious absence of penalties for 
lower education. In any case, returns to education (in terms of 
employment probabilities) in the country, perhaps with the exception of 
Athens and Thessaloniki, remain even today rather low. In one way or 
another, these results indicate an overall deficiency in the creation of 
skilled jobs in the country and possibly also a qualitative mismatch 
between skills supplied and demanded – suggesting problems of labour 
market efficiency, at least outside the main urban agglomerations of the 
country. 
 20 
3.3 Unemployment risk for other characteristics 
Considerations of labour market efficiency can also be made with regard 
to gender and ethnicity, two variables that are often associated with the 
presence of labour market discrimination. In the period 2005-2008, the 
female penalty (in terms of unemployment risk) ranged between 5.1% in 
Athens and 12.6% in Western Macedonia (Figure 5). Most of the regions, 
however, had female unemployment risk coefficients (marginal effects) 
upwards of 8.5%, consistent with the historical pattern of higher rates of 
female unemployment in Greece. Although this may possibly be due to a 
greater availability of ‘male’ jobs in (parts of) the country, it is likely also 
an indication of some degree of gender discrimination in the labour 
market.18 The effect of the crisis is somewhat difficult to distil from the 
obtained results. On the one hand, for almost all regions the coefficients 
obtained from the probit regressions (not shown) have declined 
substantially, indicating an improvement in the relative position of 
females during the crisis. On the other hand, the marginal effects 
calculated for the gender dummy at average sample values (Table A.2) 
show a mixed picture, with relative unemployment risk rising in the 
majority of regions (especially Thessaly, Continental Greece and Crete) 
and only declining in a few (EMT, Ipeiros, Western Greece and Athens). 
The difference between the two sets of results is clearly attributable to 
the compositional changes in workforce characteristics that have 
occurred between the two periods. Combining the two sets of results, it 
is perhaps safe to conclude that the crisis has not brought about an 
absolute improvement in the labour market position of females (a fall in 
                                                 
18
 Analyses of the female wage penalty in Greece have shown that this is quite substantial, especially 
outside the public sector, and indeed can be associated to labour market discrimination, as a large part 
of it survives even after controlling for other personal and job characteristics (Kanellopoulos and 
Mavromatas, 2002; Livanos and Pouliakas, 2009; Christopoulou and Monastiriotis, 2013).  
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‘discrimination’) but rather only a relative improvement which is due to 
the rising exposure of males to unemployment risk.  
Figure 5. Relative unemployment risk for females, by region and period 
 
(a) Pre-crisis (2005-08)   (b) Post-crisis (2009-12) 
Notes: Marginal effects for the gender dummy calculated at average sample values and 
derived from region-specific probit regressions of individual unemployment risk. See the text 
for more details.  
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Figure 6. Marginal unemployment risk for being foreign-born, by region 
and period 
 
(a) Pre-crisis (2005-08)   (b) Post-crisis (2009-12) 
Notes: Marginal effects for the foreign-born dummy calculated at average sample values and 
derived from region-specific probit regressions of individual unemployment risk. See the text 
for more details.  
The trajectory followed in the case of the penalty for migrants (foreign-
born – Figure 6) is much more clear-cut and shows a significant 
deterioration in their labour market position (and thus, arguably, rising 
discrimination). Historically, unemployment risk probabilities for this 
variable were generally low (and only positive in three regions: Ionian, 
EMT and North Aegean), while unemployment risk was lower for 
migrants in four regions, including the two metropolitan regions of the 
country. Since the crisis, however, unemployment risk for this group has 
increased substantially, reaching very high values especially in the 
regions where this was already high. By 2012, this risk reached 
extremely high values also elsewhere, including Thessaloniki, North and 
South Aegean, Crete and Attica – while it climbed to 27% in EMT (see 
Table A.5).  
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Figure 7. Marginal unemployment risk for being married, by region and 
period 
 
(a) Pre-crisis (2005-08)   (b) Post-crisis (2009-12) 
Notes: Marginal effects for the married-status dummy calculated at average sample values 
and derived from region-specific probit regressions of individual unemployment risk. See the 
text for more details.  
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Figure 8. Marginal unemployment risk for household size, by region 
and period 
 
(a) Pre-crisis (2005-08)   (b) Post-crisis (2009-12) 
Notes: Marginal effects for the continuous household-size variable calculated at average 
sample values and derived from region-specific probit regressions of individual 
unemployment risk. See the text for more details.  
In contrast to these changes, unemployment risk associated to 
household characteristics (marital status and household size) exhibited a 
rather low spatial differentiation prior to the crisis and has changed 
rather uniformly since the crisis. Married people had generally a lower 
probability of unemployment; in most cases (except in the Ionian, South 
Aegean and Western Macedonia), this effect intensified with the crisis 
(Figure 7), doubling in size in the regions of Thessaloniki, Central 
Macedonia, Attica, Crete and North Aegean and, by 2012, reaching 
values near or above 12%. Similarly, the unemployment risk assigned to 
household size – this time a positive one – was generally low (or non-
significant) in the pre-crisis period but has increased notably during the 
crisis (except in Crete), reaching by 2012 values near or above 5% in EMT 
and the North and South Aegean (Figure 8).  
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Figure 9. Marginal unemployment risk for youth, by region and period 
 
(a) Pre-crisis (2005-08)   (b) Post-crisis (2009-12) 
Notes: Marginal effects for the 16-24 age-group dummy calculated at average sample values 
and derived from region-specific probit regressions of individual unemployment risk. See the 
text for more details.  
Our last set of results concerns the incidence of unemployment across 
different age groups. As noted earlier, in our analysis we have used the 
age group of 35-44 as our base category, so the reported results can be 
seen as the additional unemployment risk of a particular age group 
relative to that of the 35-44 group. The result that stands out, invariably 
in all cases except for the South Aegean in the pre-crisis period, is the 
relative unemployment risk associated to youth (Figure 9).19 Before the 
crisis, the additional unemployment risk associated to youth was near or 
above 10% in the north and north-west regions (EMT, Central 
Macedonia, West Macedonia, Ipeiros, Ionian, and North Aegean); but it 
was between 6-7% in the metropolitan regions (Athens and 
Thessaloniki), and notably lower (4% or less) in the south and south-east 
                                                 
19
 All other estimated unemployment risks are either non-significant (typically for the age-group of 45-
54) or very small (typically, around 2% for the 25-34 group and -1.5% for the 55-64 group).  
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regions (Attica, South Aegean and Crete). This geographical distribution 
changed quite sizeably during the crisis: parts of the north (West 
Macedonia, Ipeiros and Central Macedonia) continued to be on the top 
of the distribution, but other parts of this group (Ionian and North 
Aegean) have now amongst the lowest youth penalties (together with 
Crete). The South Aegean and Attica, which in the past carried small or 
no youth penalties, have now a penalty of over 12%, and group together 
with Continental Greece and Thessaloniki, which also saw sizeable 
increases in this penalty. In contrast, Athens, EMT and the Peloponnese 
only saw rather modest increases. Overall, between the two periods the 
relative unemployment risk for the 15-24 age-group rose by over 50%. It 
should be noted, however, that – as with the case of the female penalty 
– this effect is almost entirely compositional, as the direct probit 
estimates (z-scores) present a rather different picture, with the youth 
unemployment penalty being in the vast majority of cases not 
significantly different, in a statistical sense, between the two periods.  
Changes in the relative unemployment risk for other age groups are 
much more modest (typically less than 20% and often negative or non-
significant) – with the exception perhaps of West Macedonia and 
Continental Greece, where the unemployment risk for older age groups 
(relative to the 35-44 group) declined rather substantially, and the 
regions of Thessaly, Thessaloniki and Western Greece, where the 
relative unemployment risk for the 24-35 group increased quite sizeably 
(see Tables A2-A5 in Appendix). 
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4. Decomposition analysis: macro-geographies of 
unemployment 
The analysis undertaken thus far has revealed a at times substantial 
degree of regional differentiation both in terms of the unemployment 
risk assigned to individual characteristics and in terms of changes in this 
risk during the crisis. Moreover, it has revealed that compositional 
changes (or differences between regions) may be playing an important 
role in determining the size of the imputed unemployment risk (marginal 
effects) for different characteristics. To disentangle the effect of such 
compositional movements/differences from that of pure valuation 
changes, we proceed in this section to a decomposition analysis as 
explained in section 2. We do not implement this decomposition for 
each region separately but rather apply our analysis on a number of 
regional groupings that we construct. This is partly for ease of 
presentation, but also serves the additional purpose of allowing us to 
explore the spatial variation in the incidence and the determinants of 
unemployment risk along wider geographical lines and divisions (macro-
geographies) – and to link these to possible structural or systemic factors 
that may be responsible for the observed variation.  
Among the possible factors of differentiation, we look in this paper at 
factors that have to do with differences in production structures 
(agricultural versus non-agricultural regions), agglomeration (Athens, as 
the only significant financial and economic centre in the country, versus 
the rest of Greece), physical geography (island versus mainland regions), 
historical-political geography (north versus south), and labour market 
performance (high- versus low-unemployment regions). Membership of 
regions to these groups is presented in the Appendix. We base our 
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analysis on the Neumark (pooled-estimate) decomposition, which 
expresses the ‘endowments’ component in terms of average (full-
sample) coefficients.20 Consistent with our earlier discussion, which 
separated between three types of effects (effective demand, labour 
quality and valuation of endowments), we present two sets of results for 
each decomposition. The standard decomposition is presented by means 
of graphs; while the decomposition splitting further the ‘coefficients’ 
component into ‘valuation’ and ‘effective demand’ is presented in 
summary form (selected years) in a table. As will become clear later, this 
is because splitting the standard ‘coefficients’ component into these two 
sub-components produces large differences that are difficult to present 
graphically.21   
We start our discussion here with a decomposition on the basis of 
production structures (agriculture).22 Figure 10 reveals an interesting 
picture of a decade-long difference that has been substantially altered 
by the crisis. Until 2008, unemployment in agricultural regions oscillated 
between half and two percentage points above the rate found in non-
agricultural regions. By far, the biggest part of this differential was due 
to this group’s inferior performance with regard to the valuation of 
workforce characteristics (‘coefficients’ component). In other words, 
most of the higher unemployment in these regions in the 2000-2008 
period is attributable to the relative inability of their labour markets to 
channel into employment individuals possessing characteristics that in 
                                                 
20
 Results using other decomposition methods produce qualitatively similar conclusions and are 
available upon request.  
21
 Lopez-Bazo and Montellon (2013), in their regional decomposition of unemployment risk (for the 
case of Spain), also find substantial differences within the ‘coefficients’ component.   
22
 Recall from section 2 that specialisation in agriculture appeared as a potentially relevant factor of 
differentiation in the case of education, with more agricultural regions having lower unemployment 
risks associated to education, especially prior to the crisis. 
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non-agricultural regions were typically producing less unemployment.23 
The situation seems to have been reversed with the crisis. As early as in 
2009, and increasingly over time, the ‘coefficients’ component becomes 
positive, suggesting that the valuation of workforce characteristics is 
now more advantageous in agricultural regions – which now have 
below-average unemployment rates (albeit marginally so). The 
‘endowments’ component moves in the opposite direction, becoming 
more and more negative, indicating in turn that non-agricultural regions 
obtain an increasing relative advantage in terms of workforce skills. 
Without this, the unemployment differential would have been 
significantly higher – by over 1.5 percentage points in 2012 (four times 
higher). This is an extremely interesting observation, especially in 
relation to common perceptions about an ‘exodus’ of talented workers 
to the countryside.24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 In fact, when valuated at coefficients obtained for the non-agricultural group (standard Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition), the ‘endowments’ component is positive, suggesting that agricultural regions 
had higher concentration of workforce characteristics that were more ‘marketable’ in the non-
agricultural regions.  
24
See for example the Guardian, 13/5/2011 
 (available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/13/greek-crisis-athens-rural-migration).  
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Figure 10. Neumark decomposition for agricultural – non-agricultural 
regions 
 
As discussed earlier, we can disentangle further the ‘coefficients’ 
component into a ‘valuation’ and an ‘effective demand’ effect. Table 1 
reports this for the years 2008 and 2012 (before / after the crisis) for all 
the decompositions performed in this paper. The table depicts the raw 
unemployment differential (with unemployment being higher in 
agricultural regions in 2008 and lower in 2012); the endowment (or 
labour-quality) component, which as we saw earlier worsened 
substantially between the two years; and the two sub-components of 
the ‘coefficients’ component. The latter reveal a very interesting picture. 
In contrast to what is shown in Figure 10, the valuation of workforce 
characteristics has continued to push also in 2012 towards higher 
unemployment in agricultural regions – in fact, increasingly so. In other 
words, labour markets in agricultural regions continue to disadvantage 
otherwise advantageous workforce characteristics also during the crisis. 
Instead, the whole of the ‘coefficients’ effect depicted in Figure 10 is 
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driven by the fixed-effect coefficient (a change in ‘effective demand’) 
which has pushed towards less unemployment compared to non-
agricultural regions both before the crisis and much more so in 2012. 
This shows that effective demand has declined much more strongly in 
the non-agricultural regions. The decline was so strong that it led to an 
overall unemployment disadvantage despite those regions’ ability to 
attract, and especially to direct into jobs, a workforce with more 
‘marketable’ characteristics.  
Table 1. Further decomposition of unemployment differentials prior 
and during the crisis 
Decomposition 
Year 
Raw  
differential  
Labour quality 
(endowments) 
Valuation of 
endowments 
Effective 
demand 
Agriculture - non-
agriculture 
2008 -1.362 -0.175 -4.675 3.488 
2012 0.472 -1.641 -7.610 9.723 
Island - mainland 2008 1.194 -0.083 2.451 -1.174 
 
2012 4.211 -0.608 -3.404 8.223 
North-south 2008 -1.944 0.113 1.173 -3.229 
 
2012 -1.231 -0.154 7.320 -8.396 
Rest of Greece – 
Athens 
2008 -2.460 -0.169 0.715 -3.006 
2012 -0.553 -1.917 -13.699 15.064 
Above - below average 
(year-specific) 
2008 -2.888 -0.106 -0.220 -2.563 
2012 -4.652 -0.823 -3.912 0.083 
Above - below average 
in 2000 
2008 0.812 0.207 0.996 -0.391 
2012 -3.029 1.559 10.890 -15.478 
 
Notes: authors’ calculations using the variable-specific Neumark decomposition for non-
linear models proposed by Yun (2004) and the normalisation correction of Yun (2005). The 
reference groups of regions are those listed first in each decomposition. Negative values 
denote higher unemployment for the reference group. All data are expressed in percentage 
points.  
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The role of effective demand is important also along other dimensions. 
Turning to the island – mainland distinction (Figure 11), we first note 
that unemployment differentials between these two groups have been 
rather volatile over the years, but were particularly high (near 5%) in the 
beginning and the end of the period, rising sharply during the crisis. The 
differential has throughout the period been driven by the ‘coefficients’ 
component, as the endowments component is by comparison very low. 
In 2008, much of the differential was accounted for by a more 
advantageous valuation of endowments, as effective demand was lower 
than in mainland Greece (Table 1). In contrast, in 2012 the effective 
demand component became hugely important in giving an 
unemployment advantage to the island regions, as apparently effective 
demand collapsed much more strongly in mainland Greece. According to 
the ‘valuation’ component, mainland regions responded to this fall in 
demand by improving the way in which they reward (in terms of 
employment probabilities) the characteristics of their workforce: this 
helped contain the sizeable fall in relative demand, producing a raw 
unemployment differential which is almost half the ‘effective demand’ 
differential (4.2 and 8.2, respectively).  
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Figure 11. Neumark decomposition for mainland – island regions 
 
Another important geographical distinction for Greece is that between 
the north and the south. There is an interesting political history 
associated to this, as the northern parts of the country were historically 
more deeply integrated with the Balkans and were unified with Greece 
between 60 and 80 years after the establishment of the modern Greek 
state. But there is also a more contemporary dimension to this 
distinction, encompassing concerns about cultural differences and 
differences in political representation and access to power.25 As can be 
seen from the Neumark decomposition (Figure 12), the north had higher 
rates of unemployment throughout the period. The differential 
increased in the first half of the 2000s, a development that was perhaps 
not unrelated to Greece’s entry into the Eurozone and the 2004 Athens 
Olympics. Whereas it subsequently subsided, in 2011 it seemed like the 
crisis may had re-ignited the north-south divergence. However, 2012 
                                                 
25
 See Mazower (2002) for the history of Greece in the Balkan and Ottoman context. See also Nedos 
(2007) for a light review of contemporary cultural differences.  
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saw a remarkable drop in the raw unemployment differential, possibly 
as the political instability at the time caused a larger shock in parts of the 
south and especially Athens (see Figure 13). For most of the period, the 
north possessed a small advantage in workforce characteristics 
(‘endowments’ component), which turned however into a disadvantage 
since 2011. But by far the main element in the unemployment 
differential is the ‘coefficients’ component. From Table 1, this appears 
solely attributable to a relative disadvantage in terms of effective 
demand, as the northern regions possess a relative advantage in terms 
of valuation / matching, which has been strengthened with the crisis. 
Figure 12. Neumark decomposition for north – south regions 
 
The north-south distinction leads us to another important geographical 
distinction for the country, that between Athens – the country’s capital 
and main economic, financial and political centre – and the rest of 
Greece. Although unemployment was higher in Athens in 2000, the 
capital has had lower unemployment than the rest of the country from 
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2001 onwards (Figure 13).26 The decline of relative unemployment for 
the capital in the early period appears to have been due to a relative 
improvement in the ‘coefficients’ component, which remained 
advantageous until recently but by 2012 had turned into a disadvantage 
(with a sizeable decline during the crisis). Instead, the ‘endowments’ 
component started becoming more advantageous for Athens with the 
crisis, pushing unemployment downwards (relative to the rest of the 
country) by almost 2 percentage points by 2012. But the main factor 
containing unemployment in Athens during the crisis appears to have 
been the capital’s ability to adjust to the huge demand shock instigated 
by the crisis: according to the decomposition of Table 1, between 2008 
and 2012 Athens experienced a fall in effective demand, relative to the 
rest of the country, of over 15 percentage points; the containment of the 
unemployment differential to just over half a percentage point by 2012 
was for the largest part attributed to a huge rise in the capital’s 
‘valuation’ advantage, showing a far better ability to mobilise 
‘marketable’ workforce characteristics relative to the rest of the country. 
This finding seems to compromise two rather antithetical views about 
the geography of the crisis in Greece: on the one hand, the common 
perception that the crisis hit hardest the capital; on the other hand, that 
unemployment has reached exceptionally high levels more outside 
Athens than in the capital.  
 
 
                                                 
26
 An interesting observation with regard to Athens is the significant decline in relative unemployment 
in 2008, the year immediately before the crisis, when Greece – quite ironically – achieved its lower 
unemployment rate for almost two decades. On the basis of Figure 13, it appears that the achievement 
of this historical low was in large part driven by the performance of the capital’s labour market.  
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Figure 13. Neumark decomposition for Athens – rest of Greece 
 
We take this point further in the discussion of our results in the next 
section. Before concluding this section, we perform another 
decomposition, this time along the lines of high/low unemployment. We 
do this using two different methods of classifying regions into high / low 
groups (Figure 14). First, by allowing membership into the high-
unemployment group to vary year-by-year, according to whether a 
region has above-average unemployment in that particular year. Second, 
by including into the high-unemployment group all regions that had 
above-average unemployment rates in 2000 (fixed membership). 
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Figure 14. Neumark decomposition for high – low unemployment 
regions 
     
On the basis of the first decomposition, we see that the crisis has led to 
a sizeable increase in the raw differential between regions of above- and 
below-average unemployment. As the overall dispersion of regional 
unemployment rates has in fact declined during the period (Table A.1), 
this suggests a move towards a bimodal distribution of unemployment, 
with an increasing separation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ performers. This 
rise is due to a deterioration both in the ‘endowments’ and in the 
‘coefficients’ component. Quite naturally, the main bulk of the 
differential is accounted for by the latter, i.e., by differences in the 
functioning of the respective labour markets. The results in Table 1 
reinforce this point, showing that the ‘coefficients’ effect is indeed 
linked to problems of labour market functioning (‘valuation’ 
component), as the component corresponding to effective demand has 
in fact pushed towards less unemployment in the high-unemployment 
regions in 2012. In other words, in the year that represented the height 
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of the crisis, high-unemployment regions were not those that 
experienced a deeper demand shock but rather those that failed to 
sufficiently ‘reward’ available and otherwise marketable workforce 
characteristics.  
The fixed-membership decomposition (second panel of Figure 14) offers 
another interesting observation. As can be seen, the regions suffering 
most today were performing, as a group, above the national average for 
most of the period prior to the crisis; but they had a significantly worse 
unemployment performance in the first years of the century (and 
possibly also in the 1990s). This is consistent with the view that the crisis 
has affected most those regions that had benefited more from the boom 
years after Greece’s entry into the Eurozone. Interestingly, in both 2008 
and 2012, these regions had better workforce characteristics and better 
valuation of those characteristics (Table 1) – they had in other words 
better-functioning labour markets and a more ‘marketable’ workforce. 
However, already in 2008 and much more emphatically in 2012, they 
had substantially lower effective demand relative to the rest of the 
country. This reaffirms the interpretation of these regions as the regions 
on the top of the boom-and-bust cycle.     
5. Conclusions 
The crisis has led to an unprecedented increase in unemployment in 
Greece, raising concerns about economic sustainability and social 
cohesion in the country. Given the huge shock nationally and perhaps 
the political and economic centrality of Athens, attention to the spatial 
dimension of the crisis has been subdued. This is reinforced by the fact 
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that, at the aggregate level, spatial patterns of unemployment and 
unemployment evolutions are rather mixed and difficult to describe 
using macro-geographical distinctions.  
In this paper we moved beyond the descriptive diagnosis of ‘rising 
unemployment’ and, making use of recent advances in decomposition 
techniques, we examined the dynamics of unemployment and labour 
market adjustment in the Greek regions using micro-data from the 
Greek LFS. We identified, and were able to measure, three distinctive 
influences on the regional labour markets, corresponding to 
differences/changes in labour quality, matching efficiency (valuation) 
and effective demand. Differences in effective demand, especially during 
the crisis, were found to be large, with the demand shock hitting 
disproportionately the metropolitan and north/north-western regions. 
Adjustment in terms of valuation of workforce characteristics (matching 
efficiency) was also heterogeneous, being stronger in the mainland non-
agricultural regions and especially in Athens. Crucially, the high-
unemployment regions during the crisis are not those that suffered the 
largest demand shock (as measured by the rise in ‘baseline’ 
unemployment risk) but rather those that displayed a relative 
disadvantage in matching efficiency (and, less so, in labour quality). 
Overall, problems of matching efficiency / valuation have been found to 
be an important part of the unemployment story in Greece. Especially in 
relation to education, our results suggest an important deficiency in the 
Greek labour market(s), as employment probabilities associated to 
education (years of schooling) appear particularly low (often not 
different from zero) and have increased only slightly during the crisis. A 
number of important conclusions can be derived from this.  
 40 
First, high-unemployment regions – and perhaps the country as a whole 
– suffer from a relative over-education problem, meaning that education 
is over-supplied relative to the demand for skills and thus not sufficiently 
rewarded. In turn, this suggests two things. On the one hand, that the 
skill-content of jobs in Greece (both before and during the crisis) is 
rather low, showing a deficiency in the availability of ‘good’, high-
productivity jobs. On the other hand, that the education system in 
Greece produces skills that are not directly marketable in the Greek 
labour market, showing a qualitative mismatch between skills demanded 
and skills produced.  
Second, the extent of job-competition in the country is rather limited. 
Across space, both before and during the crisis, slack labour markets 
have been found to have low (or zero) penalties for unfavourable 
workforce characteristics. Unemployment risk coefficients have 
increased (in absolute terms) with the crisis, but compared to the size of 
the shock and the extent of depression of the economy, the increase is 
not particularly sizeable – suggesting that job-competition and bumping-
down have intensified only to a limited extent. Although for some 
exogenous characteristics (gender, ethnicity) this may not be seen as a 
problem (especially as it may also be taken to imply low levels of labour 
market discrimination), for acquired characteristics (especially 
education) it rather signals a malfunctioning of the labour market, 
indicating that incentives for the accumulation of advantageous 
workforce characteristics – and the rewards for these – are also low.  
Last but not least, intra-and inter-regional adjustment mechanisms in 
the country – perhaps with very few exceptions, mainly in the 
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metropolitan areas – appear also particularly weak. As Figures 10-14 
show, valuation differentials are sizeable and rather persistent; 
especially in the period before the crisis, they have been the main 
component accounting for unemployment differences across space. It 
follows that the responsiveness of labour supply (including through 
migration) to differences in unemployment risk is very low. This is most 
probably not unrelated to the various institutional rigidities in the 
country (including in the labour and housing markets), but it also reflects 
perhaps a more attitudinal source of rigidity that has to do with people’s 
preferences (e.g., about locality) and the informal institutions associated 
to these (e.g., social networks, role of extended family, etc).  
These observations have an important policy dimension. Identifying and 
understanding the specific conditions shaping unemployment risk at the 
individual and regional levels can help inform the design of relevant 
policies, including place-based ones, that will respond to the specific 
circumstances of each local labour market and its workforce. This is 
especially important for the depressed economy of Greece, where a 
demand-led exit from unemployment is quite unlikely. As an example, 
knowing that education does not ‘pay’ (in terms of employment 
probabilities) in regions such as Crete and the Peloponnese can direct 
policy – especially in the contemporary context of continuing austerity 
and private-sector disinvestment – towards actions that selectively 
attempt to diversify the skills of the better-educated in those regions or 
to increase their mobility (while pursuing in the longer-run a strategy to 
increase the demand for skills in these labour markets). Instead, knowing 
that education carries a very high premium in the regions of Thessaloniki 
and Western Macedonia ought to direct policy towards measures that 
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seek to raise the educational qualifications – or the related labour 
market skills – of the local workforce and/or to attract educated workers 
into these regions. In a time of crisis and overall demand deficiency, 
finding the appropriate policy measures to tackle unemployment and, 
moreover, fine-tuning them across space and in response to specific 
labour market conditions is – needless to say – of paramount 
importance, not only in economic terms but also on social grounds. We 
believe that the range and character of the results unveiled in this paper 
make a small, but highly relevant contribution to this.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics 
 2000 2004 2008 2012 
 
E U E U E U E U 
Education 11.380 11.909 11.895 12.122 12.228 12.264 12.603 12.327 
 
(0.930) (0.470) (0.844) (0.704) (0.866) (0.845) (0.897) (0.552) 
Female 0.379 0.611 0.387 0.639 0.397 0.637 0.412 0.513 
 
(0.028) (0.067) (0.021) (0.049) (0.024) (0.044) (0.021) (0.037) 
Foreign 0.034 0.034 0.056 0.053 0.073 0.070 0.068 0.104 
 
(0.019) (0.015) (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.043) (0.030) (0.041) 
Hhold size 3.440 3.633 3.298 3.560 3.212 3.412 3.183 3.401 
 
(0.144) (0.264) (0.135) (0.145) (0.149) (0.232) (0.189) (0.205) 
Married 0.689 0.379 0.689 0.454 0.661 0.432 0.679 0.455 
 
(0.032) (0.075) (0.041) (0.055) (0.039) (0.093) (0.038) (0.064) 
Age 16-24 0.095 0.317 0.084 0.264 0.063 0.205 0.040 0.158 
 
(0.017) (0.063) (0.013) (0.036) (0.012) (0.053) (0.010) (0.035) 
Age 25-34 0.262 0.365 0.254 0.341 0.233 0.358 0.213 0.323 
 
(0.029) (0.057) (0.022) (0.051) (0.029) (0.058) (0.028) (0.034) 
Age 35-44 0.243 0.108 0.245 0.121 0.263 0.150 0.289 0.192 
 
(0.018) (0.033) (0.015) (0.040) (0.019) (0.037) (0.020) (0.032) 
Age 45-54 0.267 0.173 0.289 0.230 0.291 0.227 0.295 0.255 
 
(0.016) (0.029) (0.014) (0.039) (0.025) (0.061) (0.028) (0.029) 
Age 55-64 0.134 0.037 0.128 0.045 0.149 0.060 0.163 0.073 
 
(0.031) (0.011) (0.022) (0.015) (0.029) (0.014) (0.027) (0.025) 
Unempl rate 0.112 0.106 0.076 0.235 
 
0.259 0.245 0.263 0.179 
 
Notes: Average (nation-wide) values by year and employment status (E – employed; U – 
unemployed). Figures in parentheses give the standard deviation of the regional distribution 
of each variable for the particular year-group. Figures in Italics give the coefficient of 
variation of the distribution of regional unemployment.  
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Table A.2. Marginal effects from region-specific probit regressions (2000) 
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Education 0.162 0.0833 -0.819** -0.240 -0.451** 0.214 0.324* -0.622*** -0.311 0.178 -0.795*** -0.000718 -0.0162 -0.883*** -0.754*** 
 (0.166) (0.183) (0.330) (0.220) (0.216) (0.245) (0.177) (0.241) (0.206) (0.188) (0.285) (0.262) (0.159) (0.103) (0.162) 
Female 5.973*** 11.28*** 10.52*** 10.99*** 16.67*** 2.316 7.862*** 13.69*** 9.290*** 9.989*** 9.205*** 4.944*** 7.575*** 7.953*** 7.717*** 
 (1.197) (1.251) (2.027) (1.525) (1.438) (1.749) (1.282) (1.529) (1.355) (1.307) (1.961) (1.552) (1.182) (0.674) (1.077) 
Foreign 9.080** 8.568 11.88 0.000 4.461 2.158 -6.175 -2.785 -10.56*** 3.131 19.38** 1.388 2.895 -0.647 -5.041 
 (4.115) (5.305) (9.298) (0.000) (5.588) (5.700) (5.170) (6.573) (3.718) (3.772) (9.314) (4.771) (3.010) (1.422) (3.274) 
Hhold size 0.554 -0.809 -0.644 1.678** 0.423 1.067 1.419*** 0.940 1.590*** -0.0534 0.645 1.956*** 0.182 1.060*** 0.781 
 (0.489) (0.512) (0.915) (0.654) (0.553) (0.771) (0.462) (0.604) (0.477) (0.541) (0.752) (0.689) (0.427) (0.287) (0.483) 
Married -4.878*** -6.577*** -1.953 -6.468*** -8.231*** -5.215** -8.666*** -4.733** -8.691*** -5.014*** -6.494*** -3.380 -4.981*** -8.224*** -9.953*** 
 (1.556) (1.619) (2.694) (2.109) (1.772) (2.131) (1.567) (2.011) (1.772) (1.737) (2.250) (2.189) (1.429) (0.806) (1.385) 
Age 16-24 7.805*** 10.90*** 23.55*** 11.33*** 10.36*** 2.716 12.78*** 18.18*** 6.851*** 11.49*** 3.559 7.675** 7.030*** 11.12*** 8.727*** 
 (2.207) (2.115) (3.715) (2.998) (2.546) (3.081) (2.087) (2.644) (2.364) (2.416) (2.983) (3.134) (1.903) (1.186) (1.907) 
Age 25-34 5.568*** 4.588*** 7.623*** 7.208*** 6.646*** 6.050** 5.527*** 7.327*** 0.229 4.164** 3.616 4.629* 1.193 5.918*** 4.207*** 
 (1.768) (1.766) (2.785) (2.344) (2.045) (2.430) (1.803) (2.278) (1.985) (1.893) (2.458) (2.693) (1.639) (0.939) (1.555) 
Age 45-54 1.390 -4.670** -5.450 -2.323 -4.547* -2.064 -1.699 -5.155* -3.081 -1.140 -6.510* 1.384 -5.310** -1.287 -0.704 
 (1.936) (2.202) (3.477) (2.560) (2.549) (3.240) (2.285) (2.690) (2.241) (2.081) (3.911) (3.026) (2.221) (1.107) (1.721) 
Age 55-64 -6.388** -9.672*** -10.13** -7.861** -12.83*** -0.312 -4.323 -11.46*** -3.470 -9.379*** -10.98* 2.426 -10.03*** -0.648 -2.384 
 (3.051) (3.260) (4.837) (3.493) (3.824) (3.905) (3.414) (3.831) (3.095) (3.295) (6.191) (3.849) (3.067) (1.535) (2.717) 
Net u-risk 4.35*** 8.77*** 20.07*** 4.87*** 10.10*** 1.37*** 2.25*** 10.08*** 9.91*** 4.99*** 16.43** 0.49*** 4.90*** 18.51*** 19.49*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.087 0.179 0.130 0.151 0.194 0.128 0.188 0.176 0.118 0.139 0.171 0.135 0.158 0.102 0.112 
Obs 2,186 2,201 1,093 1,558 1,869 755 2,191 1,800 2,108 2,006 702 960 2,079 8,956 3,375 
 
Notes: Marginal effects (multiplied by 100 / expressed in percentage points) calculated on average sample values (standard errors in parentheses). 
‘Net unemployment risk’ is the cumulative probability (one-sided) of the standard normal distribution associated to the corresponding fixed effect 
(see text for details). *, ** and *** show significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table A.3. Marginal effects from region-specific probit regressions (2004) 
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Education -0.214 0.140 -1.649*** -0.0137 0.223 -0.314 -0.0701 -0.613*** -0.261 -0.215 -0.566* -0.401 -0.176 -0.558*** -0.371** 
 (0.198) (0.201) (0.324) (0.187) (0.185) (0.338) (0.187) (0.223) (0.161) (0.163) (0.307) (0.266) (0.144) (0.117) (0.170) 
Female 13.77*** 12.65*** 14.81*** 9.913*** 10.36*** 6.910*** 13.17*** 11.58*** 5.757*** 9.959*** 15.01*** 7.334*** 5.292*** 7.256*** 9.637*** 
 (1.379) (1.345) (2.028) (1.260) (1.295) (2.245) (1.332) (1.393) (1.074) (1.133) (2.073) (1.786) (0.973) (0.755) (1.065) 
Foreign -15.61** 0.563 0.850 2.122 -2.163 9.530** 4.095 -3.641 -3.268 0.636 -0.672 2.184 -2.065 -2.064 0.849 
 (6.894) (3.484) (8.591) (3.036) (3.354) (4.306) (3.434) (3.669) (1.990) (2.471) (5.907) (4.840) (2.644) (1.302) (2.235) 
Hhold size 1.129* 1.802*** 1.175 1.289*** 0.693 0.0716 0.791 2.170*** 1.096** 0.600 2.658*** 1.820** 0.811** 0.820*** 2.825*** 
 (0.641) (0.537) (0.878) (0.481) (0.512) (0.879) (0.508) (0.591) (0.443) (0.422) (0.922) (0.715) (0.391) (0.307) (0.467) 
Married -5.657*** -6.183*** -6.738** -7.594*** -5.430*** -5.956** -7.096*** -9.619*** -4.553*** -3.740*** -9.232*** -8.978*** -3.679*** -3.770*** -7.568*** 
 (1.831) (1.727) (2.810) (1.584) (1.571) (2.707) (1.622) (1.740) (1.294) (1.444) (2.451) (2.167) (1.190) (0.876) (1.277) 
Age 16-24 8.540*** 14.58*** 21.28*** 13.94*** 10.24*** 6.760* 9.936*** 8.026*** 7.490*** 12.07*** 4.834 3.186 5.533*** 6.891*** 7.812*** 
 (2.585) (2.462) (3.796) (2.288) (2.380) (4.107) (2.401) (2.440) (1.915) (1.951) (3.645) (3.260) (1.622) (1.292) (1.788) 
Age 25-34 0.989 8.605*** 4.815* 6.301*** 6.196*** -1.573 6.021*** 3.389* 4.329*** 4.252*** 3.200 3.067 1.650 1.018 2.717* 
 (1.847) (1.858) (2.820) (1.831) (1.780) (3.178) (1.866) (1.894) (1.530) (1.553) (2.508) (2.517) (1.276) (0.988) (1.403) 
Age 45-54 -5.204** -0.426 -14.31*** 2.135 -0.473 0.341 -3.100 -5.252** -0.920 -1.720 1.320 -0.645 -5.710*** -3.708*** -5.631*** 
 (2.099) (2.209) (3.746) (2.021) (1.995) (3.205) (2.132) (2.206) (1.748) (1.724) (3.212) (2.840) (1.657) (1.144) (1.730) 
Age 55-64 -12.33*** -1.154 -6.426 -0.854 -3.560 -7.038 -5.277 -4.870 0.868 -6.681** -5.997 -1.360 -11.70*** -2.780* -3.326 
 (3.343) (3.061) (4.363) (2.825) (2.921) (4.974) (3.428) (3.177) (2.257) (2.825) (5.921) (3.767) (3.230) (1.613) (2.460) 
Net u-risk 9.59*** 2.44*** 32.03* 4.63*** 2.94*** 13.81*** 6.11*** 11.55*** 5.66*** 4.61*** 4.01*** 7.64*** 5.72*** 13.22*** 6.23*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.116 0.145 0.175 0.127 0.125 0.073 0.132 0.129 0.081 0.145 0.196 0.104 0.114 0.069 0.120 
Obs 2,268 2,057 1,037 2,519 2,155 741 2,224 2,041 2,611 2,550 758 963 2,759 6,200 3,484 
 
Notes: See notes in Table A.2.  
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Table A.4. Marginal effects from region-specific probit regressions (2008) 
VARIABLES 
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Education -0.261 -0.306 -0.836*** -0.439** 0.153 -0.781** -0.257 -0.481** -0.628*** 0.0379 -0.403 -0.366 0.0702 -0.289*** -0.699*** 
 
(0.174) (0.193) (0.317) (0.185) (0.193) (0.349) (0.191) (0.216) (0.159) (0.174) (0.279) (0.236) (0.137) (0.0968) (0.169) 
Female 9.478*** 7.791*** 12.16*** 12.57*** 6.444*** 8.370*** 9.070*** 8.210*** 6.736*** 8.288*** 7.101*** 6.775*** 5.032*** 3.369*** 7.915*** 
 
(1.308) (1.317) (2.170) (1.310) (1.339) (2.320) (1.359) (1.335) (1.028) (1.203) (1.889) (1.747) (0.981) (0.618) (1.121) 
Foreign 1.291 0.836 7.681 2.380 1.912 1.028 2.780 -3.371 -4.199** -1.249 6.324** 0.366 -0.484 -1.955* -2.907 
 
(3.052) (3.277) (7.200) (2.736) (3.474) (3.752) (3.997) (2.626) (1.905) (2.289) (2.683) (3.518) (1.998) (1.045) (1.949) 
Hhold size 0.514 0.774 1.738** 1.116** 0.779 1.652* 0.918* 1.603*** 0.775* 0.351 0.781 -0.352 -0.0482 0.740*** -0.0237 
 
(0.625) (0.554) (0.727) (0.554) (0.474) (0.908) (0.473) (0.499) (0.410) (0.539) (0.603) (0.770) (0.429) (0.263) (0.487) 
Married -4.188** -3.125* -7.942*** -3.748** -7.568*** -3.575 -9.630*** -5.422*** -3.089** -4.810*** -3.545* -2.878 -2.264* -5.003*** -1.645 
 
(1.636) (1.634) (2.859) (1.596) (1.529) (2.844) (1.578) (1.633) (1.242) (1.423) (1.899) (2.137) (1.174) (0.804) (1.361) 
Age 16-24 7.784*** 8.962*** 9.969** 11.96*** 4.923** 11.58*** 10.56*** 8.302*** 5.403*** 6.795*** 4.324 3.437 3.688** 6.459*** 8.385*** 
 
(2.554) (2.474) (4.361) (2.394) (2.462) (4.189) (2.162) (2.567) (1.908) (2.099) (3.155) (3.566) (1.838) (1.121) (2.132) 
Age 25-34 6.146*** 3.075* 2.811 5.703*** 2.136 1.937 2.971* 4.078** 3.788*** 3.149** 2.986 1.294 0.930 3.062*** 5.733*** 
 
(1.837) (1.784) (3.039) (1.693) (1.764) (3.506) (1.804) (1.876) (1.432) (1.503) (2.137) (2.425) (1.340) (0.868) (1.445) 
Age 45-54 2.723 -3.627* -4.648 -4.127** 1.948 0.0629 -2.055 -2.585 -0.944 -4.798*** -1.164 2.080 -0.973 -0.812 -5.656*** 
 
(1.886) (1.944) (3.036) (1.872) (1.908) (3.047) (2.149) (1.901) (1.547) (1.831) (2.861) (2.472) (1.432) (0.965) (1.726) 
Age 55-64 -1.656 -4.206 -3.835 -6.677** -0.127 -6.218 -1.132 -4.961* -3.346 -5.966** -2.278 -5.619 -2.026 0.160 -4.110* 
 
(2.869) (2.650) (4.151) (2.652) (2.485) (4.362) (2.987) (2.633) (2.243) (2.644) (3.429) (3.604) (1.746) (1.272) (2.252) 
Net u-risk 5.06*** 6.51*** 15.34*** 4.87*** 3.49*** 8.24*** 7.31*** 6.48*** 9.87*** 4.41*** 3.33*** 11.39*** 3.80*** 6.94*** 16.01*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.088 0.095 0.106 0.161 0.086 0.124 0.160 0.128 0.087 0.128 0.224 0.056 0.049 0.086 0.089 
Obs 1,964 1,732 957 2,147 1,745 664 1,886 1,766 2,633 2,157 615 864 2,493 5,958 2,982 
 
Notes: See notes in Table A.2.  
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Table A.5. Marginal effects from region-specific probit regressions (2012) 
VARIABLES 
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Education -0.897*** -1.284*** -1.711*** -1.602*** -1.102*** -0.661* -0.348 -0.917** -0.545 -0.382 -1.383*** -0.407 -0.928*** -2.341*** -2.544*** 
 
(0.242) (0.291) (0.493) (0.324) (0.306) (0.397) (0.277) (0.364) (0.376) (0.288) (0.531) (0.523) (0.276) (0.213) (0.290) 
Female 6.047*** 8.914*** 13.12*** 8.316*** 14.47*** 8.953*** 6.788*** 14.93*** 9.327*** 10.91*** 12.97*** 7.132** 9.319*** 3.185** 8.649*** 
 
(1.986) (2.005) (2.920) (2.138) (1.952) (2.611) (1.979) (2.217) (2.371) (1.737) (3.276) (3.498) (1.899) (1.358) (1.926) 
Foreign 26.94*** 8.565* 6.169 -3.086 -3.171 7.673 7.490* 0.542 13.27*** 6.056** 17.90** 15.25** 12.60*** 1.204 13.20*** 
 
(5.161) (4.592) (9.036) (5.166) (5.206) (4.690) (4.504) (4.094) (4.266) (3.078) (7.651) (6.374) (3.197) (2.326) (4.089) 
Hhold size 4.176*** 3.027*** 0.153 1.803** 0.499 1.802 2.892*** 3.227*** 2.593*** 3.214*** 7.312*** 4.605*** 0.303 2.543*** 1.902** 
 
(0.757) (0.852) (1.261) (0.870) (0.800) (1.102) (0.776) (1.014) (0.953) (0.787) (1.672) (1.433) (0.820) (0.635) (0.885) 
Married -11.33*** -12.86*** -7.558* -9.114*** -11.14*** -3.311 -16.11*** -14.65*** -15.63*** -13.84*** -12.08*** -4.531 -13.30*** -12.24*** -12.16*** 
 
(2.434) (2.529) (3.869) (2.624) (2.526) (3.320) (2.470) (2.699) (2.956) (2.122) (4.656) (5.101) (2.302) (1.602) (2.313) 
Age 16-24 16.78*** 21.25*** 34.18*** 27.88*** 18.56*** 5.051 21.24*** 14.95*** 14.42*** 23.29*** 11.08 14.33* 10.57*** 15.55*** 18.45*** 
 
(3.959) (4.122) (6.749) (4.210) (4.202) (5.510) (3.954) (4.536) (4.663) (3.583) (6.957) (8.430) (3.702) (2.786) (4.398) 
Age 25-34 7.726*** 5.767** 9.780** 12.37*** 8.324*** 1.203 9.163*** 4.260 -0.158 9.342*** 3.174 0.684 6.249** 5.461*** 8.502*** 
 
(2.772) (2.855) (4.077) (2.924) (2.775) (3.879) (2.830) (3.130) (3.537) (2.441) (5.072) (5.065) (2.577) (1.861) (2.612) 
Age 45-54 -4.961* -2.194 -11.59*** -2.831 -5.220* -3.248 2.637 -5.489 -2.614 -4.908* -7.805* 6.545 -5.826** -0.0211 -5.370** 
 
(2.871) (2.794) (4.165) (3.092) (2.771) (3.491) (2.814) (3.353) (3.290) (2.555) (4.690) (5.046) (2.682) (1.847) (2.568) 
Age 55-64 -8.752** -9.518** -19.61*** -14.35*** -23.49*** -13.28*** -2.571 -14.03*** -4.564 -6.155* -5.145 6.261 -9.844*** -3.631 -3.919 
 
(3.670) (3.910) (5.937) (3.867) (4.455) (4.870) (3.746) (4.871) (4.461) (3.217) (6.298) (5.608) (3.694) (2.487) (3.409) 
Net u-risk 22.18*** 30.89*** 53.04 36.54 36.92 15.48*** 19.0*** 31.70** 29.05** 12.63*** 15.32*** 6.15*** 38.44* 60.18* 64.88** 
Pseudo-R2 0.101 0.098 0.107 0.122 0.136 0.060 0.091 0.106 0.067 0.173 0.137 0.062 0.079 0.076 0.088 
Obs 1,800 1,638 874 1,674 1,726 745 1,857 1,565 1,623 1,805 586 497 2,046 4,443 2,178 
 
Notes: See notes in Table A.2.  
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Table A.6. Region groupings for the decompositions 
Region 
Agricul-
tural 
Island North 
Above-average unemployment 
2000 2004 2008 2012 
East Mac. & Thrace X 
 
X 
 
X X X 
Central Macedonia X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
West Macedonia 
  
X X X X X 
Ipeiros 
  
X 
 
X X 
 
Thessaly X 
 
X X 
 
X 
 
Ionian 
 
X 
  
X X 
 
Western Greece X 
   
X X X 
Continental 
Greece 
X 
  
X X X X 
Attica 
   
X 
  
X 
Peloponnese X 
    
X 
 
North Aegean 
 
X X 
    
South Aegean 
 
X 
     
Crete 
 
X 
     
Athens 
   
X 
   
Thessaloniki 
  
X X X X X 
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